

DE KONINCK, CHARLES, De la primauté du bien commun contre les personnalistes
Le principe de l'ordre nouveau, Québec, Editions de l'Université Laval; Mon-
tréal, Editions Fides, 1943 20cm XXIII-195pp. \$1.25.

Ce livre traite du bien commun à trois points de vue bien distincts. Dans une première partie, intitulée: De la primauté du bien commun contre les personnalistes, on établit la primauté du bien commun sur le bien singulier de la personne. Cette partie comprend trois chapitres. Dans le premier, on démontre d'une part, que le bien commun est supérieur absolument au bien singulier et meilleur qu'"lui"; et, d'autre part, qu'il est en raison même de sa communicabilité le bien le plus propre et le plus parfait de la personne. Le deuxième est consacré à la réfutation des prémisses les plus fondamentales du personnalisme: fausse conception de la dignité et de la liberté de la personne, de l'ordre, de l'univers, du bien commun de la société dans son rapport aux personnes qui en sont les parties, du bien commun qu'est la béatitude, de la vie spéculative, etc. On y met aussi à jour le côté sophistique de certains arguments des personnalistes, qui procèdent par transgression des genres. Ceux qui savent lire et qui ont parcouru la littérature considérable où il est question de personnalisme, de dignité humaine, de liberté, d'humanisme intégral ou chrétien, d'humanisme de l'Incarnation, etc., auront vite compris que M. De Koninck ne s'attaque pas ici à des fantômes de son imagination, ou à une erreur de surface plutôt négligeable, mais à une erreur des plus pernicieuses, courante, et fort généralisée. Le troisième chapitre est aussi de grande actualité en ce qu'il fait voir avec une évidence à crever les yeux, que l'une des conséquences les plus immédiates du personnalisme est précisément ce totalitarisme barbare et inhumain que les personnalistes prétendent combattre au nom de la liberté et de la dignité de la personne.

L'auteur ne se contente pas ici d'exposer une doctrine, et il a jugé nécessaire de s'attaquer aux personnalistes. Il aurait fort bien pu mettre en exergue à son ouvrage le texte sacré avec lequel saint Thomas ouvre sa Somme contre les gentils: "Ma bouche méditera la vérité, et mes lèvres détesteront l'impie". Mais, au fait, qui sont ces personnalistes? Le lecteur attentif n'aura aucune peine à les reconnaître, car la précision avec laquelle il formule leurs positions rend impossible tout malentendu sur leur identité; ils sont d'ailleurs légion. En taisant leur nom M. De Koninck ne suit-il pas l'exemple de saint Thomas qui, dans son Contra Averroistas et son Contra Murmurantes, par exemple, va jusqu'à citer ses adversaires sans les nommer?

Dans une deuxième partie, sous le titre: Le principe de l'ordre nouveau, on montre que la négation de la primauté du bien commun git à la racine même de la pensée moderne, depuis la Renaissance jusqu'à nos jours. Cette deuxième partie se divise elle aussi en trois chapitres. Dans le premier, l'auteur déduit les plus importantes qui découlent immédiatement de la négation de la primauté du spéculatif, à savoir le rejet de la science morale et de la prudence, et l'émancipation totale de "l'homme pur artifex". Dans le deuxième on dégage l'idée de fond, la ratio sub qua des principaux systèmes philosophiques modernes, où l'on voit que ces conséquences ont été progressivement vécues et érigées en doctrines, et que "on ignorant et on niant les choses qui sont meilleures que l'homme, et conséquemment la sagesse elle-même, la pensée moderne a tout simplement ignoré et nié ce qu'il y a de meilleur dans l'homme lui-même: qu'elle a, en vérité, doté ce qu'il y a de plus inférieur dans l'homme, inférieur tant au point de vue spirituel qu'au point de vue matériel, d'attributs quasi divins". Nous trouvons là sous le titre: Au commencement le verbe de l'homme, des remarques très profondes des plus opportunes sur l'humanisme philosophique de la Renaissance, sur Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, sur l'affranchissement du langage humain de l'intelligence, sur la méthode historique moderne, etc. Et le marxisme? Il fait l'objet du troisième chapitre. La critique qu'en fait M. De Koninck est sûrement la plus poussée et on

même temps la plus intelligible qu'on ait tentée jusqu'ici. S'appuyant sur les textes les plus décisifs des docteurs marxistes, il montre bien que cette erreur, issue de l'humanisme de la Renaissance à travers Descartes, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Feuerbach, constitue la plus radicale et la plus épouvantable perversion de la pensée humaine, tant spéculative que pratique, tant philosophique que théologique. Le marxisme, en effet, pousse la divinisation de la conscience humaine jusqu'au nihilisme: "L'immortalité qui mettrait l'homme sous la dépendance d'autre chose que soi, qui serait par conséquent contraire à sa dignité, sera elle-même "courageusement niée". Que rêve-t-on encore d'humanisme intégral? Nous l'avons là, sous nos yeux

La troisième et dernière partie comprend cinq appendices intitulés: L'épanouissement de la personnalité - Chaque personne désire son bien - Mabuchodonoser, mon serviteur - Feuerbach interprète saint Thomas - La révolution des philosophes de la nature. Il y a grand profit à les lire et méditer tous les cinq, mais les deux derniers sont particulièrement brûlants d'actualité. On y verra que l'anthropothéisme de Ludwig Feuerbach, "auquel Marx et Engels ont emprunté leur humanisme absolu", n'est pas, loin de là, une erreur négligeable pour nous, thomistes. Non seulement il "nous mène bien au-delà du pélagianisme" en s'incorporant le mal lui-même où "il cherche une profondeur qui rend l'homme commensurable à Dieu"; non seulement il se présente comme le terme ultime et le couronnement de l'évolution historique du christianisme; non seulement il aboutit en fait "à l'exaltation de la sensualité sexuelle, où s'accomplit l'homme-Gattung de manière physique, concrète"; mais encore, son auteur prétend trouver dans la Somme théologique "les racines historiques de sa conception", et "il cite saint Thomas pour chacune de ses assertions les plus fondamentales". On voit d'ici l'ampleur insoupçonnée que le danger, déjà très grand, de cette doctrine reçoit de son acointance hypocrite avec la plus haute autorité théologique de l'Eglise. Heureusement, M. De Koninck fait bonne justice de cette interprétation contournée de saint Thomas par Feuerbach. Et ce n'est pas trop tôt, car il court en certains milieux thomistes une interprétation de tels textes de la Somme étrangement semblable à celle qu'on donne l'auteur de L'Essence du christianisme pour justifier son anthropothéisme. Quant au dernier appendice, il devrait faire réfléchir ceux qui ne voient dans les systèmes philosophiques qu'un passe-temps de cabinet. On y cite, pour le commenter ensuite à la lumière des principes thomistes, un texte du poète Heine sur la philosophie allemande de son temps, et dans lequel on prédit cent ans d'avance le conflit meurtrier qui se déroule présentement sous nos yeux. Prophétie? Non pas, mais clairvoyance d'un penseur qui connaissait bien les philosophes de la nature de son pays, et qui savait que "la pensée précède l'action comme l'éclair le tonnerre".

Il va de soi que ce résumé succinct ne donne qu'un aperçu très incomplet et forcément superficiel de la substance du livre de M. De Koninck, lequel est beaucoup trop dense et trop formel, et traite de son sujet à la lumière de principes trop peu compris de nos jours, pour se prêter impunément à une synthèse aussi rapide et aussi généralisée. Il faut le lire tout entier et le méditer soigneusement, si l'on veut se faire une idée complète et détaillée à la fois du pro et contra des problèmes qui y sont débattus. Ajoutons qu'il ne faut pas y chercher un traité du bien commun: le titre du livre indique suffisamment que son auteur ne veut exposer de la doctrine aristotélico-thomiste du bien commun que les seuls aspects directement mis en cause par l'erreur personnaliste en particulier, et la pensée moderne en général.

Enfin, nous attirons l'attention du lecteur sur la préface de son Eminence le Cardinal Villeneuve. Elle est vraiment remarquable par le tableau général et en même temps précis qu'elle brosse de l'état actuel des esprits chez nos scolastiques contemporains. Remarquable aussi par le cri d'alarme autorisé, et hélas trop justifié, qu'elle lance à nos consciences endormies, et complices

involontaires des rusés des "enfants de ce siècle... plus habiles entre eux que les enfants de la lumière". Cette préface constitue pour le livre de M. De Koninck une introduction on ne peut plus appropriée, et une justification non équivoque de sa valeur doctrinale et de son opportunité.

A notre humble avis, ce livre est de nature à dérouter certains catégories de lecteurs, formés par des scolastiques modernisants et qui pratiquent l'art de créer chez le lecteur 'cultivé' l'illusion de tout comprendre. Il les heurtera aussi par son refus de recourir à des circonlocutions qui diminuent la précision technique du vocabulaire scolastique.

Signalons enfin que ce livre montre que la division chez les thomistes est aujourd'hui beaucoup plus profonde et plus universelle qu'on ne veut l'admettre en quelques milieux. Aussi bien, nous croyons qu'il ne sera pas au goût de ces Thomistes à la main tendue, et qui sont sans cesse agités du désir de composer avec la pensée moderne. Ceux-ci ont poussé la largeur d'esprit jusqu'à s'indigner de ceux qui aboient contre le pervertissement de vérités pourtant fondamentales. "Les gardiens d'Israël" sont tous aveugles, ils ne savent rien; ce sont tous des chiens muets, qui ne peuvent pas aboyer; ils rêvent, ils se couchent, ils aiment à dormir" (Isaïe, 65, 10-11).

Eugène Babin

~~Notes d'abord~~

1^{re} rédaction de ces notes: C.D.K.

Notes recopiées par Th. De Kervick.

Théologie Mariale

I. La mort de Marie

Encore que la définition de l'Assomption ne contienne pas le mot "mort" toute la tradition que rapporte la Constitution Munificentissimus Deus, est témoin que la mort de Marie n'a jamais été mise en doute par les Pères, les Docteurs, ou dans la liturgie.

Il est vrai que S. Epiphane ne se prononce pas. Mais l'Eglise n'a pas coutume de faire sienne l'incertitude d'un Père en particulier. Et l'on sait qu'elle juge inadmissible bien des opinions personnelles des Pères.

Le R.P. Jugie, qui n'a pas lui-même voulu se prononcer sur la question, a pourtant insisté que la fête de la Dormition a précédé celle de l'Assomption,

Les auteurs de la thèse dite immortaliste soutiennent que, dans la Constitution Munificentissimus Deus, seules les citations qu'apporte Pie XII font mention de la mort de Marie, et que celui-ci ne s'identifie pas à cet enseignement. Contre cela, nous signalons d'abord que Pie XII eût facilement pu ne citer que les documents qui parlent d'Assomption, mais qu'il a au contraire inclus dans son texte tout ce qui se rapporte à la mort de la Vierge. Et surtout nous marquons qu'une telle interprétation n'est en rien conforme à l'exposé qu'on lit au début d'un document qui, hors la définition elle-même, est issu du Magistère ordinaire de l'Eglise ; or c'est à la lumière de cet exposé que la définition doit être interprétée. Voici l'exposé que fait Pie XII :

" En effet sous la direction et la conduite de leurs pasteurs, les fidèles ont appris par la sainte Ecriture que la Vierge Marie a mené, au cours de son pèlerinage ici-bas, une vie de soucis, d'angoisses et de souffrances ; ils ont su, de plus, que s'est réalisée la prédiction du saint vieillard Siméon : qu'un glaive acéré lui transperça le coeur au pied de la croix de son divin Fils, notre Rédempteur. Et de la même façon (Parique modo), ils ont admis sans peine que l'admirable Mère de Dieu, tout comme son Fils avant elle, était décédé (Quemadmodum jam Unigenam

genam suum, ex hac vita decessisse). Mais cela ne les a aucunement empêchés (Hoc tamen minime prohibuit) de croire et de professer ouvertement que son corps si saint ne fut jamais (numquam) soumis à la corruption du tombeau et que cet auguste tabernacle du Verbe divin ne fut pas réduit en pourriture et en poussières.

On allègue aussi le fait que l'offertoire, de même que l'oraison de la messe de l'Assomption, ne mentionnent plus la mort de Marie. Il peut paraître plus raisonnable d'y voir un sentiment maintenant plus explicite de l'Eglise, savoir : qu'on ne peut assimiler la mort de Marie à aucune autre, si ce n'est quant à l'essentiel, la séparation de l'âme du corps mortel, sans que cette séparation, qui toujours se produit dans un seul instant, ait été précédée d'une altération corruptive et suivie d'une corruption du corps. De peur que les fidèles n'associent ces états à ce qui constitue essentiellement la mort, l'Eglise emploie de préférence, dans la définition de l'Assomption, l'expression expleto terrestris vitae cursu : "le cours de sa vie terrestre étant terminé" (achevé ou accompli, autant de manières de traduire" expleto "). Il s'agit cependant bel et bien de sa vie terrestre, et ce passage ne pourrait se traduire, sauf en forçant la note, "sa présence sur la terre" ou "sa vie sur terre étant parvenue à son terme".

II. La Méditation

En vertu de sa plénitude de grace, Marie a contribué d'une manière active à l'oeuvre de Rédemption universelle, par son consentement, par son acception volontaire de la passion du Fils. Suivant l'expression de Pie XII, Marie, "en supportant ses immenses douleurs d'une âme pleine de force et de confiance, plus que tous les chrétiens, vraie Reine des martyrs, compléta ce qui manquait aux souffrances du Christ... pour son Corps qui est l'Eglise". Cela paraît suffire pour affirmer qu'elle est cause universelle, encore qu'instrumentale, de toutes les graces qu'elle a co-mérité avec et sous la dépendance du Christ.

S. Joseph

Ne serait-il pas opportun de rappeler l'enseignement de Léon XIII au sujet du Patron de l'Eglise Universelle ? Il fut manifestement l'image visible en terre du Père Eternel.

L'appartenance à l'Eglise :

Peut-on dire qu'il est possible d'appartenir invisiblement à l'Eglise visible ?

Les enfants baptisés en dehors de l'Eglise Romaine, de quelle manière appartiennent-ils à l'Eglise visible ou de quelle manière cessent-ils d'y appartenir ?

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p. 3, ligne "royal", au lieu de "descendence", mettre: "descent".
OFFICE OF THE DEAN

p. 4, ligne "whereas"... : "root cause", et non pas "root-cause".

p. 6, ligne "For, the Angel..." Enlever virgule.

p. 7, ligne "of universal", trait d'union entre CD & redemption.

p. 13, ligne "It is, indeed", au de "the proper of the parent", mettre: "indeed, proper to a parent to..."

p. ~~13~~ 13, ligne suivante, au lieu de "the proper", mettre "proper to domestic..."

p. 14, ligne "keep dwelling", au lieu de "Keep dwelling and growing", mettre: "Et main and grow".

p. 16, ligne "Saint", mettre S majuscule à "saint", et enlever "he" d'avant "family".

Voir cherchie: The Mariological Society of America, CDK et sources.

la conférence
Plan de l'article: The Nature of Mary's Universal Queenship
Cet article est de CDK.

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corrections CDK.

(2) même texte pp. 23 à 23 - autre copie -

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Copie du dernier testé de M. de Kourick-

THE NATURE OF MARY'S UNIVERSAL QUEENSHIP

Although by themselves alone the Scriptures appear to afford our faith no clear testimony of Mary's actual Queenship, nor of its universal scope, that dignity of the Mother of God is nevertheless acknowledged plainly and with unanimous consent, by the Christian Tradition. Indeed the Church, for a long time now and with great devotion, through the sayings of the Fathers and the Popes, the teachings of the Councils and the prayerful strains of the Liturgy, has not ceased to proclaim her belief in this prerogative. It is indeed a fact we would not dare to disbelieve. It is no less a comforting truth, one whose meaning is more than worthy of our meditation. Let us, therefore, attempt to understand the nature of this honour, that we may unfold the true significance of that glorious title: Queen of Heaven and Earth - Regina coeli, gloriosa Regina mundi.

Within the plan of Redemption, Mary's Queenship is one, as it were, with the Kingship of Christ. Just as the glory of the Mother of God is a reflection of the glory of her Son, so also is her Queenship a participation in the royal prerogatives of Christ. Our Lady is Queen of that same Kingdom of which Christ is King. ~~She~~ ^{He} She is so in the proper sense of that name, and not by a mere figure of speech. The theologian would say : sensu vero et proprio, etsi analogico. For, when taken metaphorically, the term "queen" simply means excellence. To say that Charity is the queen of the virtues

is to say that its perfection surpasses that of all other virtues. According to this meaning of the word, there can be no doubt that Mary is the queen of all Creation; indeed, her perfection excels by far that of all other creatures taken together. However, when praising her Queenship, the Church implies much more than that. Mary deserves this title in its most proper sense, more so, in fact, than any other person who ever bore that name. And while in one respect she is queen in the sense that is both usual and strict, over and above there is the respect in which her queenship is at the same time quite transcendent and unique.

The name King is a title which has ever been used, even in Scripture, to qualify a person who, being the supreme authority of the land, is invested with a threefold power : legislative, judiciary and executive. And this is precisely the authority we recognize in Christ. Now it should be plain that as queen of a reigning king, Mary does not enjoy or share in this power in the manner in which it belongs to the head of the realm. The role of queen is not a dividing one, but should on the contrary enhance by a new and characteristic quality the governance of the community. To this intent she must be more than a mere companion, more than a crowned partner who would share in the other's power, the difference being one only of degree. Whatever prerogatives she may have, surely they cannot be defined as a mere attenuation of the powers of a king. That her's is nevertheless a power extending to all members of the kingdom in a fashion

unique and irreplaceable, all this is plain from the history of royal governance. Similarly, the Fathers, the Popes, and the Councils, when speaking of Mary's Queenship, set no bounds to her far-reaching power — it is a sovereign one, extending as it does both to Heaven and Earth. But what it is, whence it is derived, and how it is put to practice, all that remains to be shown.

Yet, even so vague a conception of Mary's prerogative as queen should suffice to distinguish it as a particular quality which, however intimately related, is not quite conveyed by that more basic character which is hers as the Mother of Christ. Nor is a woman queen for being the mother of a king. Neither the mother of Saul nor the mother of David were queens. Besides, it is permissible to believe that Mary could have been made mother of God without sharing in the work of Redemption to the extent that she actually did, and without becoming the spiritual Mother of men or being made their Queen — except in a loose and wide sense.

The divine Motherhood of Mary is in fact the foundation of all the unparalleled privileges God has showered upon her, but, in our opinion, there is not the proximate cause of her Queenship. It is however worth recalling that although his royalty is not in itself an inherited one, yet it is owing to Mary that Christ is of royal ^{descent} ~~descent~~. It was she who brought Him forth of royal blood, the source of the human ties that bind Him to His ancestor David. But this royal lineage has little to do with Christ's own kingship, whose origin is divine. Nor would it confer upon Mary the quality

of sharing as Queen in the governance of Christ's Kingdom.

Can the theological reason of Mary's Queenship be found in the relations that bind her intimately to the three Persons of the Holy Trinity? Some theologians have thought so. That Mary is the beloved daughter of God the Father, the mother of the Son and the spouse of the Holy Ghost, all this indeed accounts for the transcendent holiness that is hers. Still, it is not immediately clear that such is the proper reason of her queenship.

More widely acknowledged is the opinion that this proximate foundation is to be sought in Mary's universal mediation. Which would mean, in other words, that she is Queen because she is Mediatrix. Yet even this opinion does not seem to get to the root of the matter. For, on the one hand, if her universal mediation could obtain without its being that of a queen, but of a mother say, the queenship could be adequately related only to a particular kind of universal mediation; whereas on the other hand, if we really want to reach the root cause of her queenship, we would still have to seek the proper principle of this latter kind of mediation which, while having the nature of cause with regard to us, must still have a cause of its own. Upon closer examination, then, it might well turn out that her mediation is of this kind because she is Queen, and that this quality again has a proportionate cause. In brief, to say that she is Queen because she is Mediatrix, is to say very little until we can specify the exact nature of her mediation.

So as to proceed upon a sound basis, with clarity and order,

we have chosen as our guide the following words from an allocution of His Holiness Pius XII, intended for the pilgrims to Fatima in 1946:

"He, the Son of God, reflects on His heavenly Mother
 "the glory, the majesty and the dominion of His Kingship;
 "for, having been associated with the King of Martyrs in
 "the ineffable work of human Redemption as Mother and
 "Cooperatrix, she remains for ever associated to Him, with
 "an almost unlimited power, in the dispensation of graces
 "which flow from the Redemption. Jesus is King throughout
 "all eternity by nature and by right of conquest; through
 "Him, with Him and subordinate to Him, Mary is Queen by
 "grace, by divine relationship, by right of conquest and
 "by singular election. And her Kingdom is as vast as that
 "of her Son and God, since nothing is excluded from her
 "dominion".

We shall consider in the following order the substance of doctrine conveyed by this comprehensive and meaningful statement :

(a) Mary is Queen by singular election. (b) Mary is Queen by grace, by divine relationship, by right of conquest. (c) What does the Queenship of Mary add to her Motherhood? (d) She now enjoys the full powers of Queen in the vast Kingdom of her Son.

I - From all Eternity, Mary was destined to be Queen
of Christ's Kingdom by her own choice.

The account of the Annunciation reveals Mary as freely consenting to be associated with the work of Redemption in a unique fashion. Her share in this divine work is less dependent upon her consent to be the mother of the Son of God than upon her voluntary acceptance of Him as the Saviour, i.e. Jesus, this being the name above all names, expressing precisely the reason why He came amongst us. By giving express consent to be the mother of such a son she accepted no less the lot that was to be hers as a consequence. She knew that by this consent she was to share in the whole work of Redemption. For, the Angel had plainly stated that this Saviour would be King_g and that He would reign forever. Mary's free acceptance not only made possible the one and the other but in each instance she must be recognized as a "per se" cause.

God himself has willed it so. It is the Predestinator who here reveals his plan established by eternal decree : Mary's consent is designed as essential to the founding as well as to the governance of Christ's Kingdom. And it is She who in consequence freely elects this King of Mercy, thus making it possible for the Kingdom to be what it shall be. Fiat mihi secundum verbum tuum -- it is in this consent to God's designs on the Son of man that Mary first appears in her intimate association with Christ the King. Consenting to become the mother of the Saviour-King, she thereby accepted to share in the work of man's salvation as God has willed it, and not less so in the eternal

reign of Him who was to save the world and conquer his Kingdom.

In other words, it is not so much in her consent to become the mother of the divine Son that Mary is revealed as uniquely and so intimately associated with the work of Redemption as such : far more to the point is her acceptance of this her Son in his role of Saviour and of King. She has shared in His life of Saviour and of King to the extent where it is no longer possible to conceive the Kingdom without seeing Mary by the side of her reigning Son — the Queen seated at the right hand of the King.

It is in this scene of the Annunciation, in the simple yet sublime dialogue of the Angel and the Virgin, that the Church first perceives Mary's incomparable privileges, and, in particular, the role of universal ~~core~~redemptrix assigned to the mother of the Saviour by the Blessed Trinity. The teachings of the Fathers bear witness to it, and the Sacred Liturgy takes pleasure in recalling it on many occasions. It is in the setting of Nazareth's humble abode that the New Testament first conveys this intimation of the mystery of Our Lady's royal prerogative. Seeing that the Annunciation is the revealed truth of a special work of God, it is no wonder that one can admire in it a most perfect order. This order, being both intended and expressed, to us, by God, is of capital importance. In it is to be found an abundant source of light which helps the mind to catch a glimpse of God's designs. The Angel's words and the Virgin's answer combine so as to manifest what the economy of Redemption will be. This Son, whom the Virgin will conceive, to whom she will give birth, shall be great, says the Angel, and men will know him for the Son of the Most High; the Lord

God will give him the throne of his father David, and he shall reign over the house of Jacob eternally; his kingdom shall never have an end.

Hence the Virgin cannot doubt it: her Son shall be the Saviour. Thou shalt call him Jesus, the Angel said. But he shall also be King -- as He himself will tell us : I am a King (John, xviii. 37) -- and reign without end.

The Angel's pronouncement is clearly expressed to the Blessed Virgin who knows the Scriptures and possesses the light to understand. She shall be the mother of God, and this God, made man, shall be Saviour and King. God eternal, in whom all predestination is made, proposes his designs to the Virgin, and invites her to give consent. The Virgin's answer is simple but not less comprehensive. She accepts it all : Ecce ancilla Domini, fiat mihi secundum verbum tuum -- Behold the handmaid of the Lord; let it be unto me according to thy word. She accepts and wills the person and the life of this Jesus, she wants with God everything that her Son shall be and everything He shall do. In so doing she becomes a unique associate of this Saviour in the economy of Redemption, accepting as she does that leading part which only she could fill -- the share and function, as it were, of a first principle, in the establishment of her Son's Kingdom. By complying unreservedly with God's designs, she intends to acquiesce in everything God has proposed to her. Thus she becomes an associate of her Son in order to perform with Him the whole of His work and establish that reign which shall never end. All of which amounts to saying that she shall be one with him inasmuch as he is

King. This alone means that she is Queen of the Kingdom over which He rules. The Christian Tradition has never interpreted differently the touching scene of the Annunciation and the dialogue between Angel and Virgin. It has always seen in it the revelation of God's full designs on Christ and on His Mother.

Let us conclude this first part : The Annunciation intimates to Mary that by divine election and in virtue of her own choice she is to be Queen of the eternal Kingdom. And now we shall see that she is also Queen by right of conquest.

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II - Mary is Queen by grace, by divine relationship,
by right of conquest.

We hold it as a divinely revealed truth : in the fulness of her grace, Mary was conceived immaculate. ^{The} ~~This~~ abundance of grace which was accorded her in view of the merits of Christ must not be understood as a quality which perfects the Mother of God merely in her own person. "Oh God — says the Collect of the Feast — who by the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin has prepared a worthy dwelling for thy Son..." In other words, ^{even} this privilege is not without special regard to her Son and indeed will enhance everything that in any way proceeds from her. As a consequence of this purity and radical innovation her share in the work of her Son and in his victory will be the greater. It renders Mary so much more adequate to her task, adding new depth and greater glory to the whole order of Redemption.

There can be no doubt that in her plenitude of grace the Virgin was made adequate to that intimate association with the Son in the tasks and achievements which the Angel revealed and to which she gave humble assent. In that very humility she magnifies the Lord, and in her spirit rejoices in God her Saviour; because He who is mighty had done great things for her (Luke, i. 46).

Christ is King by nature. Not, however, according to his divinity when considered in itself — except in a metaphorical sense, by reason of his excellence —, for a King must be of one nature with his subjects. Nor is he King "by nature" in virtue of his humanity

alone : he is King by nature because his humanity is united to the divine Person.

Mary is Queen (a) "by grace" : by her Immaculate Conception she was made to be the "worthy dwelling-place" of this her Son even as He is Saviour and King. And how could this obtain unless she is as intimately associated with the King as one could be? But no one is closer to the King's heart than the Queen. Her grace, therefore, must be proportionate to this dignity. (b) She is Queen by "divine relationship". According to saint Albert the Great, the title "Queen of Mercy" is the one which expresses most properly the dignity of the Blessed Virgin. But the dignity which is hers by reason of the unique relationship with the Blessed Trinity -- as daughter of the Father, mother of the Son, and spouse of the Holy Ghost -- would be diminished in its effect if she did not deserve a corresponding and therefore supreme authority in the Kingdom of her Son. Furthermore, her relationship with the divine Son is not merely that of a mother, but of a mother who, full of grace, had been conceived immaculate. Therefore, the Compassion with her Son was that of a mother, namely of sorrow, not of pity -- for, as saint Thomas, says, "in the case of those who are so closely united to us as to be part of ourselves, such as our children or our parents, we do not pity their distress, but suffer as for our own sores" (*) --, it was, besides, the Compassion of the Immaculate Mother with her Son, Saviour and King. This is noteworthy, for the pure of heart are more assimilated to, and have a better understanding of the innocent victim than they who themselves bear guilt. Hence, without the privilege of Immaculate Conception, the

(*) - IIa IIae, q. 30, a. 1, ad 2.

Mother of God could not have been so intimately associated with Him in his Passion. (c) Like her Son who is King, Mary is Queen, "by right of conquest". The Holy Father states the reason why : she was "associated with the King of Martyrs in the ineffable work of human Redemption as Mother and Cooperatrix". She cooperated with her Son in a manner proportioned to His quality as Saviour and King. Surely this cooperation was more perfect than that of any queen with her King. Now, it is precisely in His Passion that Christ conquers his realm by driving out the devil -- the prince of darkness, by whose envy death came into the world (Wisdom, ii. 24). And Mary is the Woman who, in compassion with the fruit of her womb, crushed the head (Gen., iii. 15) of this same king over all the children of pride (Job, xli. 25). To deserve the right and title of Queen, what greater might should this woman have displayed than that by which she vanquished the ^{evil one} ~~one~~ of whom it had been said that there is no power upon earth that can be compared with him who was made to fear no one; he beholdeth everything; he is king over all the children of pride (Job, xli. 24).

III - What does the Queenship of Mary add to her Motherhood?

All along we have assumed the distinction between motherhood and queenship. We must now be more explicit. The concept of Mother naturally evokes that of generation, and that of family; whereas the concept of Queen suggests to our mind the idea of a political society. It is, indeed, ^{to a} ~~the~~ proper ~~of the~~ parent to give the child being and life - to endow it with esse -- just as it is ^{to} ~~the~~ property ~~of~~ domestic society to lead the child through its development to maturity. On the contrary, civil society -- being, precisely, a perfect society -- has the mission of endowing the citizen, already mature, with esse perfectum: that is to say, with the perfection of his activity, with freedom (causa sui), as incorporated in the perfection of political life. (1) The family, on the other hand, is but an imperfect society, inasmuch as, unaided by association in a wider community, it cannot attain even its own domestic end, namely the mental and bodily development of the child. (2)

(1) - "... Because man is by nature a social animal, being in need of many things for his life which alone he cannot provide for himself, it follows that by nature he is part of some group by whom help may be given him for living well. This help, indeed, he needs for two things. In one respect, of course, for those things that are necessary to living, without which the present life cannot be lived: in this regard man receives help from the domestic group, of which he is a part. For, from his parents every man has begetting and nourishment and upbringing. And, likewise, the individuals who are parts of the domestic family help one another in procuring the necessities of life. In another respect, man, again as a part of a multitude, is also helped in regard to living a perfectly sufficient life; that is, so that a man may not only live, but also live well, possessing all things that suffice him for living. And in this way the civic group, of which he is a part, helps a man, not only as regards bodily things, that is, inasmuch as in a state there are many crafts for which one household cannot suffice; but also as regards moral matters, that is, in so far as arrogant youths whom paternal admonishment is not able to correct, are checked by fear of punishment from public authority". (St. Thomas, In I Ethicor., lect. 1, (Pirota) n. 4).

(2) - Pius XI, Divini Illius Magistri.

Now the child, of course, belongs to both family and political community. However, inasmuch as he has not as yet come to maturity, he is only indirectly a member of the latter, that is, through the parent who is a citizen in his own right; and the authority to which he remains immediately subject, is that of the parent.

If, then, we say of the Blessed Virgin that she is Mother of God, we mean that she conceived and gave birth to Him according to His human nature. Likewise, by her title "Mother of grace and of mercy" we mean to express, not only that she is Mother of the One who is grace and mercy, but also that it is to her spiritual motherhood that each of us owes the divine life we receive through the Sacraments. More precisely, it is in Baptism that we receive our esse, so to speak, in the supernatural order; and the Eucharist is spiritual nourishment. Now it is she who, as a mother, has caused us to be born to the life of grace and who, thenceforward, watches over us with delicate care so that the grace of adoption which has made us children of God should *remain and grow* ~~keep dwelling and growing~~ in our souls.

On the other hand, when invoking the Queen of mercy we turn to Mary as her to whom has been entrusted the care of watching, in her own fashion of woman, over the unfolding of divine life in that most perfect of all societies which is the Kingdom of Christ. Furthermore, when raising our eyes to this Queen endowed "with an almost unlimited power", why should we not think more particularly of her care for the confirmed : that is, those who receive and enjoy the sacrament of spiritual maturity — of the fulness of grace? For it is they who, in a rigorous sense of the term, bear the character of citizens in the

City of God. They are the soldiers of Christ, who possess the strength to confess publicly and to defend the divine truth against the enemy. (3) As such, they, more strictly than the rest of the baptized, are obliged to serve the Queen in the very measure of their devotion to the cause of the King. Concives et domestici, citizens, yet brothers, in the realm of Christ the King, the confirmed have the full duty of doing everything in the power given them, to maintain and extend the universal rule of

- (3) - For this particular comparison of Baptism and Confirmation, see, especially, IIIa Pars, q. 72 : a. 1, c. et ad 3; a. 2, c. et ad 2; a. 4, ad 3; a. 5, c., ad 1 et 2; a. 11, c. et ad 2.

— "... Sacramentum baptismi est efficacius quam hoc sacramentum (confirmationis), quantum ad remotionem mali, eo quod est spiritalis generatio, quae est mutatio de non esse in esse. Hoc autem sacramentum est efficacius ad proficiendum in bono, quia est quoddam spirituale augmentum de esse imperfecto ad esse perfectum". a. 11, ad 2.

"Homo autem, cum ad perfectam aetatem pervenerit, incipit jam communicare actiones suas ad alios; antea vero quasi singulariter sibi ipsi vivit". a. 2, c.

"... Baptismus datur ad spiritualem vitam simpliciter consequendam... Sed hoc sacramentum (confirmationis) datur ad plenitudinem consequendam Spiritus Sancti, cujus est multiformis operatio". *ibid.*, ad 2.

"Nam in baptismo accipit homo potestatem ad ea agenda quae ad proprium pertinent salutem, prout scilicet secundum seipsum vivit; sed in confirmatione accipit homo potestatem ad agendum ea quae pertinent ad pugnam spiritualem contra hostes fidei..." a. 5, c. "... Confirmatus accipit potestatem publice fidem Christi verbis profitendi, quasi ex officio". *ibid.*, ad 2.

"Hoc autem confirmationis sacramentum est quasi ultima consummatio sacramenti baptismi, ita scilicet quod per baptismum aedificatur homo in domum spiritualem, et conscribitur quaedam spiritalis epistola; sed per sacramentum confirmationis, quasi domus aedificata in templum Spiritus Sancti, et quasi epistola conscripta signatur signo crucis". a. 11, c.

"... In hoc sacramento homo... insignitur signo crucis, sicut miles signo ducis..." a. 9, c.

-- Baptism is indeed the most "necessary" of the sacraments, but we should never forget that Confirmation is more perfect: "Unde etiam pueri confirmati decedentes majorem gloriam consequuntur, sicut et hic majorem obtinent gratiam". a. 8, ad 4.

"Et ideo illi qui habent curam puerorum debent multum esse solliciti quod confirmentur, quia in confirmatione confertur magna gratia. Et si decebat, majorem habet gloriam confirmatus, quam non confirmatus, quia hic habuit plus de gratia". Saint Thomas, Expositio super Symbolo Apostolorum.

Christ — not of course, by way of directing a multitude or by performing official public acts, for this is a power conferred only by the sacrament of Order. And they will act in a manner befitting the confirmed according as they are able to place themselves devotedly in the service of the Immaculate Queen whose mission it is to perfect, by merciful intercession, the governance of the Kingdom thanks to her unique association with the King who is also her Son.

Hence, in this perspective, the universality of Mary's Motherhood and that of her Queenship are not quite the same. When we say that Mary is Mother of divine grace, in the sense in which it is taken in this chapter, we do not mean to confine this maternity to the grace conferred in Baptism. Nor is it to be understood that, although the confirmed are her subjects in a very special manner, she is not Queen of all the baptized. It is characteristic of a good queen — such as Saint Elizabeth of Hungary — that she visits ~~the~~ families in need and bestows maternal tenderness upon the little ones. For it is an essential task of political society to help the family attain its own perfection of family.

Yet there remains a sense in which Mary's Queenship extends farther than her spiritual Motherhood, which is confined to man. She is called Queen of the Angels, not Mother. The extent of her Queenship is in proportion with the Kingship of her Son. For although Christ did not merit the grace of the Angels, which was given them from the beginning, yet His authority extends to them all, for He is the head of every Principality and Power. (Coloss., ii. 10) Its measure is the working of (God's)

mighty power, which he has wrought in Christ in raising him from the dead,
and setting him at his right hand in heaven above every Principality and
Power and Virtue and Domination -- in short, above every name that is
named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come. And all
things he made subject under his feet... (Ephes., i. 20). Through Christ
 the King, with Him and subordinate to Him, Mary's "Kingdom is as vast as
 that of her Son and God, since nothing is excluded from her dominion".

Saint Thomas points out specifically that Christ is not only
 the head of the faithful, but also of the Blessed who see God, "inasmuch
 as He has grace and glory most fully". (4) But even Mary's present vision
 of God is and ever will be both in extension and intension far superior
 to that of all the Blessed -- whether Angel or man -- taken together.

We must point out, however; that just as Christ himself is,
 in virtue of a common human nature, more properly King of man than of
 Angel, Mary, too, is more strictly Queen of our race. But in no respect
 does this diminish either her general superiority or her particular
 authority over the heavenly Hierarchies and Orders.

And now, let us compare the titles "Mother of mercy" and "Queen
 of mercy". We cannot stop here at their more profound meaning -- namely
 that she is Mother and Queen of the One who is mercy itself -- but must
 be immediately concerned with the Mother and Queen she is towards us by
 merciful intercession in our behalf. As we have already mentioned, the
 parent's compassion with the child is not called pity, for pity applies
 only to one who is not so close to us as to be part of ourselves. In
 this respect, we must understand, it seems, that Mary intercedes for us

(4) - IIIa Pars, q. 8, a. 4, ad 2.

with Christ inasmuch as He is her Son. And this she undoubtedly does. But there is also the respect in which she is our spiritual mother who begs Christ to be merciful towards us, her children, in the manner in which the woman implored the mercy of Salomon, king and judge, to spare her child. Yet, there is no doubt that the title "Mother of mercy" embraces at once both these meanings. In either instance, however, the term "mother" refers strictly to the order of generation.

But what does the title "Queen of mercy" add to the former? If nothing new, then all has been expressed by the title "Mother of mercy". Yet, a queen as queen does not intercede with the king as would a mother -- even though, as in the present case, the queen is also the mother of the king and can, as she does, intercede no less as such -- but requests for her subjects a favour which only the king can bestow qua king. And so we ask : What are the powers of a king?

The powers of Christ the King have been clearly defined by Pius XI in the Encyclical Quas Primas.⁽⁵⁾ But our problem is : How does the Queen share in the legislative, judiciary and executive powers which are those of the one and undivided head of the realm? In virtue of her own conquest she has the right to implore the mercy of Christ with regard to the laws He establishes or modifies for His people; she may beg Him to mitigate in our behalf the equitable judgment He is about to pass; she can stay the arm of her Son, to whom belongs the power to execute the sentence. All this she does as Queen -- whose intercession could only gain in efficacy, when she is at the same time His mother.

(5) - Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, nn. 2194-2196.

The Blessed Virgin was prefigured by Edissa, who by another name was called Esther. Now, Esther, a Jewess, was queen of the Persian king Assuerus, and implored his mercy in favour of the chosen people to whom she herself belonged. This is significant, for, whereas the Person of Christ is divine, that of Mary is one with our own. Now, to petition for her people, and for her country, Esther stood, in her glorious apparel, before the king, where he sat upon his royal throne, clothed with his royal robes, and glittering with gold and precious stones. And when he had lifted up his countenance, and with burning eyes had shewn the wrath of his heart, ... God changed the king's spirit into mildness; and all in haste and in fear, he leaped from his throne... Fear not, he said, for "this law is not made for thee, but for all others" (xv. 1, 9-13). And as a result, the king sent a letter to all the provinces of his kingdom, and in it, we note this pertinent passage : Neither must you think, if we command different things, that it cometh of the levity of our mind; but that we give sentence according to the quality and necessity of times, as the profit of the common-wealth requireth (Book of Esther, xvi. 9).

We do not see why Mary should be endowed, as Queen, with any power over the King's prerogatives other than that of merciful intercession. Mercy, "the mightiest of the mightiest", is likened to oil not only because it settles atop other liquids -- Miserationes ejus super omnia opera ejus (Ps. cxliv) -- but also because of its penetrating virtue. Such might, which Mary acquired by right of conquest in her co-redeeming Compassion, extends, in its own subtle and delicate fashion, to every royal power of her Son. And such being the nature of her share in governance, the Virgin's universal might as Queen in no way divides the unity of the throne of David.

Even here apply the words of Ezechiel : And my servant David shall be king over them : and they shall have one shepherd (xxxvii. 24).

It is all this we mean in the invocation : Salve, Regina, Mater misericordiae.

IV - "Queen assumed into Heaven!"

This is the invocation which, after the solemn definition of the Assumption, the Holy Father himself added to the Litany of the Blessed Virgin : Regina in Coelum assumpta! Thanks to the Living Voice of the Church, we now know quite explicitly, as a divinely revealed truth, that Mary, having reached the end of her earthly life, was assumed body and soul into heavenly glory -- "Expleto terrestri vitae cursu, fuisse corpore et anima ad coelestem gloriam assumptam". Why should the Virgin's Assumption be particularly relevant to her actual Queenship? Because unless she is there "body and soul", she could not now be Queen. For "Queen", like "Virgin", or "Mother", is an attribute, not of the body or of the soul taken separately, but of the complete human person, namely the composite of body and soul.

Our chief authority here will be the Apostolic Constitution Munificentissimus Deus. We have in mind, more particularly, a passage quoted by the Holy Father from saint Bonaventure, and another from saint John Damascene. The first reads as follows :

"Since her blessedness would not be complete unless she were there (i.e. with her beloved) as a person ("nisi personam liter ibi esset"), and the person is not the soul, but the conjunct, it is plain she is there according to the conjunct, i.e. in body and soul : otherwise, her fruition would not be complete".

It is therefore thanks to the Assumption that the Mother herself intercedes for us in her own person and that to Christ she can say even now "My Son". The same will hold for her Queenship, for if she were there only in soul, she could not intercede for us in her very person as Queen. The soul does not constitute the species, and a queen, like the king, must be

one in species with her subjects. And if the soul of Mary were called queen, this name would be used only in a metaphorical sense.

In other words, if Christ wanted Mary to be associated with Him, and exercise, as Mother and as Queen, the power which she merited during her life on earth, it was necessary that her very person be with Him in His present glory, i.e. body and soul. As a consequence of the Assumption, the substance of the names "Mary" "Virgin", "Mother", and "Queen" is now physically present, whereas in the case of the other Blessed in Heaven, being there only in soul, the substance of the name "Peter", say, is actually now a being of reason that refers to the person who was. True enough, we pray St. Anne and St. Peter. Yet in these cases "it is because the saints while living merited to pray for us, that we invoke them under the names by which they are better known in this life, and by which they are better known to us : and also in order to indicate our belief in the resurrection, according to the saying of Exodus iii. 6, I am the God of Abraham, etc." (6) So that in the special case of the Blessed Virgin we invoke the Mother and Queen as she now exists -- in her present person. A.v., it is the very person of Mary who, "having been associated with the King of Martyrs in the ineffable work of human Redemption as Mother and Cooperatrix, ... remains forever associated with Him, with an almost unlimited power, in the dispensation of graces which flow from the Redemption". It is owing to the Assumption that the Queen is there "personaliter".

The second passage, quoted this time from saint John Damascene, conveys essentially the same idea.

"It was fitting that she, who had kept her virginity intact
"in childbirth, should keep her own body free from all corruption
"even after death. It was fitting that she, who had carried the

(6) - IIa IIae, q. 83, a. 11, ad 5.

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"Creator as a child at her breast, should dwell in the divine
"tabernacles. It was fitting that the spouse, whom the Father
"had taken to Himself, should live in the divine mansions. It
"was fitting that she, who had seen her Son upon the cross and
"who had thereby received into her heart the sword of sorrow
"which she had escaped in the act of giving birth to Him,
"should look upon Him as He sits at the right hand of the Father.
"It was fitting that God's Mother should possess what belongs
"to her Son, and that she should be honoured by every creature
"as the Mother and as the Handmaid of God".

In other words, it is thanks to the Assumption that the Mother
of the Creator dwells in the divine tabernacles; that the spouse lives in
the divine mansions; that she who stood at the foot of the Cross now looks
upon her Son as He sits at the right hand of the Father; nor could she *otherwise*
now be honoured by every creature in her person as the Mother and Handmaid
of God. If only her soul were in Heaven, these titles could refer only to
her person of the past or of the future.

Again, it is because of the Assumption that we can say : "He,
the Son of God, reflects on His heavenly Mother the glory, the majesty and
the dominion of His Kingship," and that the Queen of Heaven and Earth now
enjoys in person the fulness of her might over the Kingdom.

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② The Nature and Use of Symbols in Science

Copie corrigée par Father Anthony Durand

Art and Morality

Art

- ① Art and Morality : schéma de confes. 5 pp. manuscrites
② " " 2 pp. dactyl.

les feuilles roses intitulées Art and Morality

et ~~and~~ Note on History

me semblent des travaux d'étudiant, dont le premier
corrigé par C.I.K.

Art and Morality and ~~the Fine Arts~~

In the beginning of his commentary on the Posterior Analytics St. Thomas (2) says: "poetae est inducere ad aliquod virtuosum per ^{aliquam} decentem ~~representationem~~" - it ^{pertains} belongs to the poet to lead toward ^{the something virtuous by means of some a} suitable representation. If we are to take St. Thomas formally, ^{he means} that ^{poetry} ~~it belongs to the poet as such~~ to serve a moral purpose, that there is a necessary connection between the work of the poet and disposing toward virtue. It is not usual to take him so at his word. Many have insisted that, since art as such is distinct from prudence, it is only as a man and not as a poet that a given writer is bound to consider the moral order in relation to his work. ^{Our} ~~it is the purpose of this~~ brief note ^{is to point out} to manifest the importance of St. Thomas's own view and the insufficiency of the ^{current} common explanation.

First, it must be clear that ^{the Angelic Doctor} ~~St. Thomas~~ did not regard poetry as a "didactic instrument" in the ordinary sense. He is perfectly clear that the poet does not proceed by argument, but seduces ^{through the reason} by similitudes in those matters which because of their lack of truth ^{do not attract the grasp of their reason} ~~are not attractive~~ (2) The ^{lowest} ~~lowest~~ of the doctrines to use argument is rhetoric; poetry, ^{however, confines itself to, just as food may be rendered repulsive when it is} makes pleasing imitations. ^{By presenting} ~~food under the likeness of something disgusting, the poet leads us to think of it as something abhorrent~~ (3) This is not the method of argument, but rather a method that involves the appetite through imaginative representations, through poetic imitation, in other words. —

It is necessary to point this out lest any one should think St. Thomas did not know what is proper to poetry, namely that it should seduce.

Secondly, ^{when} poetry ~~is an art that imitates human action, as such it~~ ^{is aimed} to manifest this action in its enchainment, as well as the consequent expression of passion and the relation of both action and passion to the comparatively

fixed element of human character. Now, the important point about human action (2) is that it is either good or bad. This is also true of human character, and of the concrete expression of passion in men. Hence, ^{in so far as} ~~since~~ poetry is concerned with these elements, it is necessarily concerned with morality, that is to say the distinction between good and evil in human action.

As a consequence, one can say that an art which represents a good action as bad or vice-versa is bad art. (~~Tota ratio ordinis trahitur a fine~~). The very purpose of poetry is to manifest human action through ^{pleasing} imitation. Thus, it is not precisely because he is a man subject to the rules of morality that an artist ^{represents dignity or represents beauty as a good.} does wrong when he ~~gives a false impression of good and evil~~. It is primarily true to say that he has offended against the very nature of his art.

It is possible that his error ^{is} ~~can be~~ a purely speculative one, and this is the case when the artist is deceived about the moral value involved. Indeed, it is only on this speculative error that a critic has a right to pronounce. All criticism, ^{to} ~~ti~~ except of the purely technical elements would be impossible if it were necessary to judge the ^{artist's} ~~incommunicable act of prudence of the artist.~~

Obviously, even a work of art that is substantially bad because ^{of a speculative error concerning human action} ~~represents the object badly~~, can have much incidental beauty in the way of elegant metaphors and all the rest that relates to the perfection of the means.

What has been said of poetry applies to ^{in so far as} ~~the~~ other arts ^{or character.} ~~they~~ are concerned with human action, ~~w~~ passion. Poetry itself is a term that can include all imaginative writing concerned with human action. To this we can add the drama, music and the dance, and even all the fine arts except architecture.

We must now return to the question of how the fine arts lead to virtue.

It is because they represent the real order or disorder in the enchainment of human action in an imaginative way that they are able to ^{involve} ~~reduce~~ the lower appetite and make it follow the way of reason rather than the random law of instinct. This discipline of the lower appetite ^{disciplines} ~~reduces~~ the struggle between reason and ~~strength~~ sense, and enlists at least temporarily the lower appetite in the service of the higher.

To summarize what has been said we can assert that the intrinsic end of the fine arts under consideration is the manifestation of ^{the order or disorder in} human actions through pleasing imitations and that their extrinsic end is to induce the lower appetite to follow the order discovered by reason. (6) The extrinsic end spoken of here is, of course, not remote but rather proximate.

Since then it cannot be said that the fine arts ^{which} imitate human action are independent of morality, the artist must ^{conform to} ~~view himself to be guided~~ by the ^{knowledge} ~~conclusions of~~ formally practical science in order to discern the character of the actions to be imitated.

Those who have spoken of this matter as if nothing more were involved than the relations of art and prudence conclude as we have seen that the work of art as such has only a per accidens relation to morality, that namely which arises because the artist as a man is subject to the law of prudence. They base themselves on certain texts in the Prima Secundae where St. Thomas is concerned with the relationship between art in all its generality and prudence, and so ~~he~~ contrasts prudence which is concerned with the good of man and art which is concerned with the good of the work, ^{asserting} ~~and he asserts~~ that the work of art as such is distinct from ~~prudence~~ the work of prudence because the end of each is different. (7)

What is said of art in all its generality, namely that, its end being ~~distinct~~ distinct ^{from} prudence, it need not take morality into account except accidentally, cannot be said of arts ^{which} ~~that~~ by their very nature are concerned with ^{the} imitation of human actions. Here the object is not independent of morality, and so neither are the arts in question.

Notes

1. In I lib. Post. Anal. Arist. lectio 1, n. 8.6
2. In I lib. Sent. Prol. Q. I, art 5, ad 3 (quote)
3. In I lib. Post. Anal. Lect. 1, n. 8.6 (quote)
4. Ia IIae, q. 18, art 9 corpus
- 5.

6. An analogous case (and the one on which this distinction is based) is that of theology. St. Thomas ^(Ia, q. 1, a. 5) says it is the noblest ~~tm~~ of the practical sciences because it leads us to the highest happiness, namely the vision of God. In answer to ~~the objection that~~ the objection that theology as such does not lead to heaven, Cajetan ^{dist.} distinguishes between the intrinsic end of theology, which is knowledge and the extrinsic (though proximate) end , which is salvation. A knowledge of the truths of faith is in itself ordered ^{and} to guiding us practically in the service of God. ~~cf. Prima Secundae, Ia, q. 1, art. 5, commentary of Cajetan in loc. n. VI~~ (quote) "....." (ed. lrm.)ⁿ

7. Ia IIae, q. 57, art. 4, cf. also art 3

Note on History

In the Poetics Aristotle says that poetry is more philosophic and more elevated than history because it is more universal (1). St. Thomas speaks of history as quaedam narratio (2). Further, it is often said that poetry is infima doctrina (3). Obviously then if history is less philosophic than poetry and poetry is infima doctrina, ~~then~~ history is not doctrina at all.

This opinion has scandalized most modern writers on the nature of history. As a result many scholastics feel themselves obliged to diminish the force of ~~these~~ the statements of Aristotle and St. Thomas, and, if possible, to explain them away.

It is common to point out works like those of Thucydides where the arrangement and selection of facts tend to manifest certain universal tendencies in the growth and decline of nations and about the nature of government. It is said that the views of Aristotle and St. Thomas apply to the works of chroniclers, men who make no attempt at scientific selection, but merely recount all that they have learned about a given set of happenings. On the other hand it would be false to apply such judgements to serious and mature works which alone can be called histories precisely because the wise selection of facts help us to understand political life.

It has been further pointed out that history can play a decisive role even in philosophy. The study of the works of his predecessors can be regarded as of ~~great~~ ^{very great} importance for Aristotle. Even today, it is asserted, St. Thomas can best be understood against the background of his sources. This would show that philosophy can ~~not~~ ^{satisfactorily} be learned through history and that those who relegate history to an infra-scientific role of mere narration do not appreciate ~~history~~ ^{it} in its true importance.

In order to see the error of these critics of Aristotle and St. Thomas it

is necessary to allude to the notion of intellectual light. The general principle, quoted from St. Paul and used by St. Thomas, is omne quod ~~est~~ manifestativum lumen est. (4) The application of this principle is most clear in demonstration where the definition is seen as causing the proper passion of the subject. The definition is a light whereby the inherence of the passion in the subject is made known to us.

In a lesser degree dialectical reasoning illustrates the same thing. Here the manifestation is at least partially through beings of reason, that is principles formed not from the nature of the subject but from the mind itself. Such principles can be used to show the probable inherence of some predicate in a subject.

Even in poetry there is still some manifestation. Events in the life of the rex fictus, Oedipus or another, are ordered according to possibility of probability. A kind of necessity in the midst of the contingent order is thereby manifested. ~~The mind~~ The mind forms the events in such a way that the reason is seduced into accepting the probability of the necessity of the order. There is here a selection and a formation of the personages that constitutes them in a certain universality, the proper stamp of the mind.

Thus poetry involves a kind of light, a principle of manifesting one thing through something else. It is a very inferior light, and it cannot be better because of the defect of truth in its object, that is the order of contingent events, of human actions. It only succeeds in being a doctrine by neglecting much that belongs to the object and constructing for itself something with a certain universality.

The historian does not have this refuge of the poet. He cannot construct the events of his record or rearrange them so that a kind of necessity will appear. Very often the events that he must record have very little connection between one

another beyond the fact that they happened at the same time. Many of the most important events he records have no intrinsic necessity. They come about through the action of some great man, who might very well have acted otherwise. Others are caused by ~~causes~~ ^{forces} that are, at least to us, irrational, like floods and plagues. With these elements it is impossible to construct a chain of necessity. ~~It is for this reason that~~ ^{Hence} the historian must be content with narration and ~~that~~ he cannot properly, as historian, manifest anything.

Like poetry, history deals with objects that are deficient in truth, contingent. Unlike poetry, history cannot even imperfectly escape ~~an~~ irrationalness in things by constructing them so that they possess an intelligibility supplied by the mind.

How then can we explain a book like that of Thucydides which so arranges events that, in a way, the source of all merchant empires is made clear; where the unfortunate effects of all revolutions are shown? The answer is, as so many authors who reject Aristotle and St. Thomas say, that Thucydides has made a wise selection of facts. However, far from proving that history is more than narration, it proves that a great historian of the stamp of Thucydides must know political science and be guided by it. The knowledge of the different types of state and what is proper to each enables him to select, from the multitude of things that happen, those events that manifest the rise and fall of merchant states and the effects of revolution. The knowledge of the different types of state and the definition of revolution is something that only political science can give. Once these notions are supplied they can be used to illuminate history. Thus, it is not history but another discipline that guides the selection of facts.

The case is somewhat complicated because political science itself can only be learned by a careful consideration of history and of actual political institutions. Aristotle composed one hundred and fifty treatises on the constitution of various states as part of the inductive study that founded his treatise on politics. The Constitution of Athens, which has survived, is only one of these. However, such

works are ~~practically chronicles~~ akin to chronicles, ⁱⁿ ~~hence~~ the terminology of our opponents. They are listings of facts, not selections based upon a sophisticated knowledge of the nature of political institutions.

Thus there is a sort of cross-fertilization of these disciplines. History, in the true sense of narratio is necessary to ~~require~~ the acquisition of the science of politics, which relies so ^{heavily} on induction. Once acquired, the science of politics can guide a writer in the selection of facts that will illustrate certain general political notions. The important thing to note here is that the universal light, the principal of selection, belongs not to history but to political science.

→ Something very similar is true of the history of philosophy. If someone who does not possess the habitus of philosophy wishes to edit the text of some philosophy, ~~or otherwise text~~ he may do so, provided no judgment of the work is involved. Even such a problem as the choice between two readings may involve difficulties that the historian as such cannot resolve. He may be adequate if the question is one of orthography or punctuation, provided the solution is not in terms of the fundamental meaning of the text.

The historian ~~cannot~~ as such cannot decide upon the truth or even the relative probability of conflicting opinions. For this reason he cannot order philosophical writers according to their importance. Furthermore, he cannot decide upon the meaning of a disputed passage in the work of even a minor philosopher, much less St. Thomas of Aristotle. Aristotle was able to order and judge the work of his predecessors and his contemporaries in relation to his own thought ^{because he} ~~in virtue~~ of the ^{possessed} ~~habitus of philosophy~~ scientific habitus necessary for accomplishing this. Thus he and St. Thomas ~~and others of their stature~~ as well as those of lesser stature who know the truth can judge the opinions of others, but no historian can judge them.

It is simply impudence for someone having no equipment beyond grammar to presume to say that ~~xxx~~ St. Thomas, for example, has misunderstood Aristotle or

St. Augustine. Such a judgment involves a penetration into the thought of these writers, and it is not given in terms of grammar alone, but of profound philosophical and theological science.

In the process of learning philosophy a student may be obliged to proceed dialectically by assigning a more or less probable meaning to the texts he is studying. Indeed, in the beginning he has no other alternative even if he follows the best and most authorized commentators. He must work toward an understanding of their thought on the basis of an imperfect and even nominal grasp ~~of their language~~. If this stage of the intellectual life is necessary, as it is, so is extreme modesty in expressing any judgment on the meaning of the texts studied during this period of learning. This is the time of apprenticeship, not of judgment.

For example, any one who would try to interpret texts on the formal object of metaphysics must do so in virtue of the definition of a formal object. This involves knowing very precisely the nature of science and the other intellectual virtues, not to mention the nature of knowledge itself. These notions can be grasped only by some one who knows philosophy. They are quite beyond the paleographer or grammarian as such, and consequently they are beyond the historian, for it is only of such instruments that he can dispose independently.

Notes

(1) Poetics, Cap. 9

(2)

(3)

(4) St. Paul to the Ephesians V, 13

(5) I, q. 2, art. 9 ad 1; IaIIae, q. 101, art. 2 ad 2

narratio cf. sent. - de locis angelis - hanc in hanc.

concerns the good of the work internal to the maker.

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Action, doing, behaving, also depend on right appetite, considered, this time, with regard to the agent, the doer, himself. Here, the good of the agent is within the agent. In this order, to have the right will, is to be a good person. A good man is one who acts as he should. ~~He should~~ ^{the desire} not to act as he should, or to do something other than what he should do, deprives a man of the quality that makes him good absolutely.

The right reason of art, and the right reason of prudence, both practical, are, nevertheless of a different order, measured by two different kinds of good.

Unde, a good artist may be a bad man; a good man a bad artist. A person may be a good builder and, at the same time, an unjust man.

(a Moralia with a pinker moral)

A good artist may produce a monstrous work and still be a good artist, and even a good man.

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A propos of
the same individual we must distinguish the good of the art and the good of the agent: one can be found without the other.

Does this mean that art does in ^{no} way depend upon prudence?

It does inasmuch as prudence is the architectonic virtue of human life. In this regard, the use of the art belongs to prudence. E.g., the builder may construct a good house on someone else's property without permission; or an able doctor... A.V., if the artist is to be a good man, he must make proper use of his art. He is not free to make what he chooses to make, without regard for the ~~good of~~ human good — no matter how good his work may be. This applies to every art.

Even in God, we distinguish His art from His providence.

The good of his art, the good that is inherent in his works....

Art for art's sake.

There is a very special problem concerning certain arts of imitation * those which imitate human action, or

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Since a person can be anything that is subject to morality. ~~Can a man~~
a good artist without being a good man, can he produce a work that is immoral and yet be a good artist?

If a drama implies that right is wrong and wrong is right, can it be good drama as art?

Answer requires distinction between { moral science
moral action.

The truth of moral sc. is not practical but specul. although the science is practical.

The birth of prudence, of (moral) action, is practical truth.

While a dramatist, say, may be a wicked ~~man~~
man, he may produce a good play.

The reason is that ~~even~~ while knowing the truth in matters of moral science, he may still be a wicked man. But, in treating of human actions, he will be a bad artist if his work is based on speculative errors.

(5)

This applies to errors in moral science as well as to errors in natural science. (Ex. Comets)

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[Even the marxist theatre must stick to some fundamental truths of moral science.]

Milton

Pericles: confined himself to use the knowledge he possessed.

Now, this does not mean that only good actions should be imitated; or that every drama or novel should teach that the good always triumphs. This would be altogether contrary to the well known truth. (Eccles.)

The dramatic imit. of evil does not require experience of evil of comings.

Oedipus Rex; Jago (Othello), Richard III. You cannot have a good tragedy with a happy ending.

Romeo & Juliet!

Tommy Belinda ruined.

Had imit. human actions

→ Yet, there is a sense in which ^{the} arts transcend moral action.

As we saw yesterday, raises us ~~up~~ above, and frees us from the contradictions of human life. We do not go to see a tragedy to suffer. There lies all the difference between life and poetry; between history and the dramatization of history. Hegel, Camerer.

Life is so unpoetic that we need poetry...

Perversions: Oscar Wilde, Proust, Gide.

2

Art and Morality

In the first lesson of his commentary on the Posterior Analytics St. Thomas states that it pertains to the poet "to lead toward something virtuous, not by a process of reasoning, but by means of a suitable representation, so that the representation itself will incline human reason to adhere to one part of an opposition rather than to the other." (1) The passage in question states clearly that poetry serves a moral purpose. Yet, many have insisted that because art is quite distinct from prudence, it can only be as a man, not however as a poet, that the latter must conform to the moral order in his work. Our purpose is to point out briefly the importance of St. Thomas's own doctrine as well as the inadequacy of the now current interpretation.

(1) "Quandoque vero sola existimatio declinat in aliquam partem contradictionis propter aliquam repraesentationem, ad modum quo fit homini abominatio alicuius cibi, si repraesentetur ei sub similitudine alicuius abominabilis. Et ad hoc ordinatur Poetica; nam poetae est inducere ad aliquod virtuosum per aliquam decentem repraesentationem. Omnia autem haec ad Rationalem Philosophiam pertinent: inducere enim ex uno in aliud rationis est." (edit. leon.) n. 6.

The position held by most contemporary Thomists is in keeping with their confusion of the speculative truth of formally practical knowledge and the practical^{truth} of prudence. (1) The "moral order" then embraces indistinctly both moral science and prudence, so that if a poem is to be morally good, only the prudent, the good man, can write good poetry. This being patently false, they conclude that there can be no essential connection between morality and poetry qua poetry. On the contrary, we believe that while the good poet may be^{an} imprudent man — and the good man a poor poet —, the practical truth of his work depends upon its conformity with the speculative truth in moral matters. All would agree that a poem which would assume some preposterous reason for the functioning of the steam-engine to compose a metaphor, would be, in that essential respect, a bad poem; we could not fail to regret the poet's ignorance. Likewise, a work representing despair or bestiality as a good, would be intrinsically and per se, false art, just as much as an ineptly constructed house, however fine the quality of the material employed.

(1) Jacques de Monléon, Note sur la division de la connaissance pratique, in Revue de Philosophie, Paris 1939, n. 3, pp. 189-198; Henri Pichette, Considérations sur quelques principes fondamentaux de la doctrine du spéculatif et du pratique, in Laval théologique et philosophique, 1945, vol. I, n. 1, pp. 52-70.

Art & Morality

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held prevented the cabin from blowing itself to bits. The fracture was immediately subjected to microscopic analysis. There was no doubt about it; the cause was metal fatigue.

This in itself did not prove that the other Comets had fallen victim to the same thing. Theoretically, they were much too young. But the one sure thing about metal fatigue is that no one can foretell with certainty when it will strike. In Nevil Shute's novel, *No Highway*, which became a popular movie starring Jimmy Stewart, the hero-scientist predicts that an airplane will fail because of fatigue, and, after intricate calculations, puts his boffinish finger on the exact moment. According to Dr. Percy B. Walker, Farnborough's fatigue expert, such prescience is impossible. No two aircraft, even sister aircraft like the Comets, are alike in their fatigue characteristics. An average fatigue life may be calculated. But a weak specimen of the metal may last only one third as long as the average, while a strong specimen may live three times as long.

By now Hall and his colleagues felt that if only they could recover the actual segment of the cabin that had

What are in general?

Reason \rightarrow open & bonum. Quasi-rational yet with mind.
Acts of intuition: \rightarrow the end, as pleasure.

that base & image.

Intuition of human action: principle of liberty.

Free problem of morality.

Leibniz, Descartes.

What morality? Right behaviour.

Why? Moral science: speculative truth.
Moral action: practical truth.

Acts of human action, must conform
to speculative truth or probability

either of speculative decision or
of practical, whether natural
or moral. (Ex. laws) If a
person respects these and is good or
good or evil... (Even though he/she
obeys this...)

Does not mean that only good actions are
intended. Tasso, Richard III, etc.

[Knowledge of evil does not require experience
of evil.]

Good man has a ship, but must sail on it,

then acts even human action above the order of
action. Therefore the complexity of the order
of action. Transcended by reason. Transcended
by pleasure intuition. (It is not so to think to
suffer - yet there is for the pleasure of existence.
Pleasures: e.g. Greenfield, Howard County,
Lancaster & others & the end & the end...)

- ① 1er texte composé par Mgr Savard - ~~avec~~ annotations de C. De K.
- ② 2e texte recopié par Mgr Savard
- ③ 1re copie dactyl. (20 pp) de ce texte ②
- ④ 2e copie dactyl. - 3 pp. dactyl.
- ⑤ Dessin et lettre de C. De K.
- ⑥ Notes des Pères G.-H. Levesque, O.P. transmises par Mgr Paré.
- ⑦ Mémoire sur l'ens. des humanités - Copie finale - 23 pp.

Mémoire sur l'enseignement
des humanités

(peut être composé à la même époque
que la philosophie au Canada de langue
française, 1957 ? (67))

Proposer des réformes est aisé. Les réaliser, généralement plus difficile: elles dérangent en effet nos habitudes; elles vont souvent à l'encontre de nos intérêts personnels; elles sont, presque toujours, longues à produire leur fruit.

Cette réforme s'avère particulièrement ardue quand elle a pour objet des choses qui constituent la part la meilleure et la plus nécessaire de tous les biens temporels de la communauté politique.

L'instabilité foncière et le caractère d'urgence des temps présents nous engagent à remettre à plus tard la solution de problèmes qui ne semblent pas intéresser immédiatement le pain quotidien et le salut public, mais sont, néanmoins, d'une importance capitale pour la vie à tous les degrés. L'éducation de la jeunesse est l'un de ces problèmes.

Quoi qu'il en puisse être de l'efficacité de nos propos sur un aussi grave sujet, c'est en toute liberté que nous parlerons au nom des humanités classiques et de la philosophie.

Généralités

Nous présupposons admis le principe d'un enseignement respectueux du droit naturel des parents, et répondant aux exigences du bien commun de la communauté civile.

L'étatisation de l'enseignement comporte les pires dangers pour la formation des citoyens libres. Surtout à une époque où l'homme politique a tendance à ne s'occuper que des biens matériels, et à ne voir, dans la poursuite des biens spirituels, qu'un obstacle aux fins purement économiques qu'il se propose.

Aussi, les totalitarismes de toute espèce qui ne manquent pas de sens pratique, placent-ils en tête de leur politique le monopole absolu de l'éducation à tous les degrés.

On doit donc, afin d'éviter une médiocrité sans nom, sauvegarder la liberté de l'enseignement.

Sur le rôle de l'état dans ce domaine, on ne saurait trop méditer l'encyclique Divinillius Magistri de S.S. Pie XI sur l'Education chrétienne de la Jeunesse.

Nous présumons aussi admise la valeur par soi éducative des études dites classiques. Il s'agit pour nous aujourd'hui plus qu'en aucun autre temps, de maintenir le niveau moral et intellectuel au-dessus du matériel et de ce qu'on désigne maintenant par l'antonome "scientifique". Or le fond de toute notre civilisation est la sagesse chrétienne qui depuis toujours a fait usage de ce qu'il y a de plus élevé dans la culture gréco-latine. La formation philosophico-classique, en effet, s'est avérée, depuis des siècles, la plus efficace pour le développement des facultés intellectuelles, esthétiques et morales. Les oeuvres qu'elle propose sont universellement reconnues comme la fleur de notre civilisation. Elles sont exemplaires, éprouvées par le temps et irremplaçables.

Cherchant à former avant d'instruire, comportant moins de savoir utilitaire, elle rend apte à découvrir l'essentiel en tout, à bien poser l'état d'une question, à hiérarchiser et à coordonner les fins et les moyens. Que si une telle étude ne donne pas toujours ce que nous attendons d'elle, il faut en chercher la cause en dehors de la valeur intrinsèque des œuvres étudiées.

Nous savons que certains pays ont cru bien faire en négligeant les études classiques pour le savoir utilitaire. Ils ne s'étaient pas rendu compte des biens supérieurs qu'ils mettaient ainsi en péril. Les présidents des Universités de Harvard, de Yale, de Columbia, de Princeton, de Californie, des savants éminents admettent aujourd'hui qu'on a commis une grande erreur en laissant les études traditionnelles à l'option des élèves. "After a generation of trial and error the free elective system is falling into discredit." (1) Les démocraties, trop souvent exposées à n'être que des machines

(1) The Humanities in Canada, p. 203.

économiques entre les mains de politiciens sans principes profonds, ont un pressant besoin de choses exemplaires. On revient vers les arts libéraux. On en comprend mieux la nécessité depuis que la barbarie menace nos institutions libres et rend possible l'horreur d'une société où les techniciens seuls seraient reconnus comme citoyens.

Des professeurs

La question des maîtres dépasse en importance celle des programmes et des manuels. Or il arrive que des professeurs soient appelés à donner un enseignement auquel ils sont loin d'être suffisamment préparés. Ce fait est lourd des pires conséquences et pour l'enfant et pour la société tout entière. Faute de professeurs dans le plein sens du terme, les disciplines les plus fondamentales deviennent, en effet, les plus vaines et les plus encombrantes. Dans une matière aussi délicate, nous nous appuyons sur le témoignage de l'un de nos éducateurs les plus autorisés.

"Or, il y a deux questions essentielles auxquelles se trouve lié tout le progrès de notre enseignement secondaire, et qui ont été plusieurs fois

agitées, non pas officiellement, mais officieusement, — et, malgré cela, nous l'espérons, non inutilement — dans plus d'un groupe de congressistes: c'est la question de la formation des professeurs, et celle du renouvellement ou perfectionnement des méthodes. Celle-ci est même subordonnée à celle-là: attendu qu'il est malaisé de persuader de l'opportunité ou de la supériorité de telle ou telle méthode un esprit qui par sa formation est resté étranger à ces méthodes, et qui pour cela serait assez embarrassé de les pratiquer. On se heurte alors à des résistances invincibles." (1)

Nous croyons donc que le premier souci de nos éducateurs devrait être la formation de maîtres d'expérience, de haute et de solide culture. C'est là, croyons-nous, le point qui résume tous les autres. Nous n'exceptons pas ici les professeurs des classes élémentaires de nos humanités dont le rôle est d'importance primordiale. Nous recommandons la formation d'un corps professoral de carrière, c'est-à-dire à la fois stable, compétent et bien rémunéré.

"...Quand on voit quelles exigences nouvelles réclame notre état de société et le besoin que l'on éprouve partout d'égaliser notre culture à celle des autres peuples, ou de la faire moins inférieure; quand on sait ce qui se passe en d'autres pays, à quoi y tient le prestige de l'enseignement secondaire et universitaire, quel prix on y attache à la compétence des maîtres; quand on se rend compte que le maître doit être non pas égal, mais supérieur à sa tâche, et que tout enseignement tend à baisser ou à s'immobiliser dans la routine s'il ne se retrempe et ne se renouvelle sans cesse, par ses maîtres,

(1) Mgr Camille Roy, Nos problèmes d'enseignement, pp. 18-19.

dans une discipline intellectuelle plus élevée; quand on songe à tout cela, on ne peut s'empêcher de déplorer les conditions qui paraissent expliquer encore chez nous les trop grandes lenteurs de la préparation professionnelle." (1)

Nous ne saurions trop insister sur les deux faits suivants: a) que nous avons, dans nos universités, des institutions d'enseignement supérieur spécialement dévouées à cette fin; b) qu'elles ne sont cependant fréquentées que par un petit nombre de futurs professeurs.

"C'est pour assurer cette vie pédagogique toujours en mouvement vers le progrès que le Conseil de l'Université a créé il y a quatorze ans, en 1920, l'Ecole Normale Supérieure; il l'a créée pour procurer des moyens plus faciles de formation spéciale, supérieure, aux professeurs des collèges classiques. Persuadés que le progrès n'est guère possible si les maîtres n'ont pas reçu eux-mêmes une culture qui fasse entrer plus de lumière et de meilleures méthodes dans leur enseignement, le Conseil de l'Université et la Procure du Séminaire de Québec n'ont pas reculé devant d'immenses sacrifices d'argent pour créer et maintenir l'Ecole Normale Supérieure. Et cette Ecole a rendu déjà de très précieux services. Me permettra-t-on d'inviter encore les supérieurs et directeurs de nos maisons d'enseignement classique à mieux ou à plus utiliser cette Ecole Normale". (2)

Nous constatons avec plaisir que nos jeunes maîtres laïques sont de plus en plus associés à l'enseignement des humanités. Nous ne voyons pas,

(1) Mgr Camille Roy, ibidem, p. 119.

(2) Mgr Camille Roy, ibidem, pp. 128-129.

cependant, pourquoi les certificats qu'on exige d'eux dans nos collèges ne devraient pas être exigibles de tous les professeurs sans distinction.

Des élèves

En égard à cette grande question du personnel enseignant, nous croyons que les élèves sont, en général, trop nombreux dans nos maisons d'enseignement secondaire. La vocation aux études classiques ne relève ni de la fortune ni de l'ambition paternelles.

Un choix judicieux de candidats devrait donc être fait: une attention très spéciale accordée aux étudiants les mieux doués; un système de bourses, créé en faveur des élèves pauvres, de nos milieux ruraux, en particulier.

Par contre, nous ne saurions trop insister sur l'opportunité actuelle qu'il y a de diriger beaucoup de nos jeunes gens vers nos écoles moyennes.

Nos écoles moyennes d'agriculture et nos écoles techniques devraient être accessibles au grand nombre. La formule artisanale, entre toutes, nous semble excellente. Très apte à former l'esprit d'initiative et le goût du travail bien fait, elle est appelée à jouer un grand rôle dans l'économie de la nation. Cet enseignement artisanal, s'il soit s'enrichir de toutes les techniques modernes, doit être avant tout basé sur la plus solide tradition. Nous dirons au chapitre du folklore ce que nous pensons que devrait être l'éducation artistique dans toutes nos écoles même primaires.

Des programmes

Une révision et une adaptation des programmes s'imposent. D'une façon générale, les programmes sont de plus en plus surchargés de matières qui regardent plutôt les spécialistes et sont d'une valeur éducative fort contestable. "...The humanities need to be thought of, not as tool subjects, but as liberalizing disciplines." (1)

(1) The Humanities in Canada.

Les méthodes encyclopédiques sont des signes de décadence. Nous ne proposons pas de grandes innovations dans le domaine des études classiques. Nous croyons, au contraire, qu'une décadence du niveau intellectuel est assurée, si l'on ne s'applique point davantage à l'enseignement des disciplines élémentaires au premier et au second degré de l'enseignement. Il faut retourner vers les notions les plus simples et les plus fondamentales, et encourager toute formule qui permet à l'élève de se développer harmonieusement dans le sens de ses aptitudes.

X

Nous n'oublions pas ici la culture de la mémoire considérée non comme une simple faculté de se rappeler, en vue d'un examen, les idées et les notions exigées par le programme, mais comme un moyen de meubler l'intelligence de pensées et de formes exemplaires. [Lire sur ce sujet les conseils que Joseph de Maistre adressait dans ses lettres à sa fille. Lire aussi un remarquable article: On learning by heart, by J. Lewis May, The Tablet, February 11th, 1950.]

note

Résumé des remarques générales

Pour assurer à l'éducation tous les biens qu'elle exige autant que pour la préserver des dangers qui la guettent, nous croyons qu'une coopération beaucoup plus étroite et constante devrait exister entre l'Université et les collèges de l'enseignement secondaire.

De plus, nous estimons qu'il serait non seulement profitable mais nécessaire et urgent qu'une coordination soit établie par un conseil supérieur de l'enseignement à tous les degrés.

Des humanités in specie.

De la Sainte Ecriture.

Pour de multiples raisons, d'ordre naturel et surnaturel, il convient que nos étudiants apprennent à mieux connaître et aimer la Sainte Ecriture: Ancien et Nouveau Testament. L'étude de textes sacrés choisis devrait, pensons-nous, être inscrite au programme de toutes nos classes d'humanités.

De la philosophie

L'enseignement de la philosophie, dans nos collèges, est loin de donner les résultats voulus. C'est un fait déplorable qu'un grand nombre d'élèves et parmi les meilleurs n'en gardent qu'un très mauvais souvenir.

Nos classes de philosophie sont beaucoup trop nombreuses. Les étudiants deviennent passifs et se contentent d'apprendre en vue du baccalauréat, des thèses qu'ils pourront répéter sans les comprendre. "Non attingunt mente, licet dicant ore."

Ils sont, en outre, assez mal préparés, par une formation trop livresque, à ce genre d'étude. Ils doivent, avec un minimum de connaissances concrètes, aborder les problèmes les plus ardu.

Il faut ajouter aussi que la philosophie, telle qu'enseignée, est beaucoup trop abstraite au sens péjoratif de ce terme. Elle semble n'avoir rien à faire avec la réalité; n'exister que dans

les livres. Les réponses viennent avant les questions, des questions qu'on ne s'est jamais posées et qu'on n'aura jamais à se poser, semble-t-il. On discute de problèmes en termes empruntés à des langues étrangères et mortes, termes qu'on devrait d'abord s'appliquer à approfondir et à comprendre.

Le manuel ne crée pas le professeur. Il ne peut remplacer le professeur. Celui-ci doit être formé aux sources. Et par sources, nous entendons les textes originaux des grands philosophes anciens et modernes, textes (les principaux, du moins) avec lesquels nos collégiens eux-mêmes devraient être en contact dans chacune des branches de la philosophie.

Cette question des professeurs ~~dont nous avons déjà parlé, plus haut~~ est particulièrement grave. Or, à la Faculté de Philosophie de l'Université Laval, la plupart des étudiants sont des étrangers. Tout se passe comme s'il n'y avait point d'avenir pour nos philosophes canadiens dans nos maisons d'enseignement.

Et pourtant, si les hommes n'apprennent pas, dès leur jeunesse, les éléments au moins les plus

humbles d'une saine philosophie, il est extrêmement improbable qu'ils puissent retourner plus tard aux principes véritables et premiers pour nous.

La philosophie s'avère plus importante aujourd'hui que jamais. Et pour tous. Son enseignement ne doit donc pas s'adresser aux seuls futurs professeurs, mais aussi à tous ceux qui jouent un rôle important dans notre société. Nous pensons, *l'avons déjà signalé,* ~~ici~~ que l'une des grandes faiblesses de nos hommes d'état est cette ignorance philosophique qui les empêche de voir les dangers les plus manifestes et les rend causes indirectes de l'insécurité qui grandit. Nous pensons aussi aux littérateurs, écrivains, critiques et aux journalistes en particulier auxquels S.S. Pie XII disait dernièrement: "...La presse a un rôle éminent à jouer dans l'éducation de l'opinion, non pour la dicter ou la régenter, mais pour la servir utilement. Cette tâche délicate suppose, chez les membres de la presse catholique, la compétence, une culture générale surtout philosophique et théologique, les dons du style, le tact psychologique."

*Nous aurons dû être fait
remarquer qu'~~ils~~ ~~même~~
n'en sont pas eux-mêmes les
premiers responsables. ~~de cette~~
~~et de la~~*

De l'étude des langues.

Du grec.

L'histoire littéraire a son utilité; mais elle ne peut remplacer la lecture et l'explication des oeuvres.

Il est fondamental de mettre nos étudiants à l'excellente école des grecs, et de leur inculquer le goût d'y revenir plus tard.

L'étude de la langue constitue, sans doute, le meilleur moyen de s'appropriier le génie d'un peuple; mais vu le temps de plus en plus limité qu'on accorde à l'étude de la langue grecque, et le caractère très fragmentaire des textes traduits, on devrait, au moins, nous semble-t-il, faciliter la lecture des grandes oeuvres classiques dans une bonne traduction.

Or, si nous sommes bien informés, ces traductions sont quelquefois inaccessibles aux élèves.

L'étude de l'art grec, architecture et sculpture surtout, est rigoureusement complémentaire de celle de la littérature grecque.

Les remarques faites ci-dessus concernant la lecture des traductions s'appliquent aux auteurs latins. [Pour une connaissance sérieuse du français à la source principale, il serait de première importance qu'on insistât davantage sur l'étymologie latine.]

Les Pères de l'Eglise grecque et latine, parce qu'ils représentent une assimilation du génie antique par le christianisme, devraient avoir dans nos programmes la place qu'ils ont occupée dans notre civilisation chrétienne.

Au sujet de la langue maternelle, nous ne saurions mieux faire que de citer les paroles de N.S. Père le Pape Pie XII dans son discours à la jeunesse italienne du 30 janvier 1949.

Après avoir souligné la place méritée du latin dans les études, le Saint Père poursuivait:

"Gardez-vous cependant d'interpréter Nos paroles comme si elles étaient l'indice d'un moindre intérêt pour les autres branches de vos études. Nul plus que Nous n'est convaincu que

quiconque est appelé à assumer la responsabilité d'une fonction, que quiconque veut écrire ou parler, doit posséder parfaitement et dans toute sa pureté, sans inutilités et sans barbarismes, sa propre langue maternelle."

Des beaux-arts

L'enseignement des beaux-arts fait partie de toute culture sérieuse. Il est éminemment propre à former le goût, à éveiller des vocations. Cet enseignement ne doit pas se limiter à la musique. Il est à souhaiter qu'on mette sous les yeux de nos élèves quelques-uns, au moins, des chefs-d'oeuvre exemplaires de l'art et qu'on les leur explique.

Cette connaissance par l'image est particulièrement importante dans un pays comme le nôtre privé des ^{monuments} ~~mouvements~~ de la grande tradition artistique.

Un programme d'éducation artistique sagement approprié à chacun des degrés de l'enseignement assurerait à la culture canadienne une continuité digne de tradition.

Nous croyons qu'un tel programme doit être envisagé comme le complément nécessaire d'un musée national et d'une bibliothèque nationale.

De l'histoire et de la géographie

Le passé et le pays sont des biens excellents que la piété naturelle nous oblige de connaître et d'aimer.

Nous recommandons, comme nous l'avons fait pour les autres disciplines, que des professeurs viennent se préparer dans les Instituts d'histoire et de géographie de nos universités.

De l'enseignement de la tradition

L'enfant est un chaînon dans la continuité. Il est héritier d'un patrimoine qu'il doit enrichir et transmettre à son tour. C'est-à-dire qu'il doit être pieux. L'éducateur doit comprendre que son disciple a le devoir et le droit de connaître la matière de cette piété.

Remplir la mémoire d'un enfant de ce qui s'est fait et écrit ailleurs sans lui enseigner sa propre tradition, c'est le frustrer d'un bien naturel, c'est l'appauvrir et souvent le dévoyer.

C'est pour cette raison que l'enfant doit apprendre l'histoire de son pays.

Mais l'histoire ne suffit pas. (Cf. Archives de Folklore, l'Histoire et le Folklore, vol. I, p. 14).

Il faut enseigner les traditions. Nous entendons par ce mot tout ce qui procède du génie populaire: idées, moeurs, sentiments, créations, inventions, expressions; tout ce qui, dans le peuple, vient authentiquement du peuple par la tradition, par l'exemple, par l'imitation; tout ce qui jaillit encore de sa nature et de son expérience.

Ces traditions méritent d'être connues et conservées. Elles ont leurs qualités intrinsèques de sagesse, de beauté, de culture naturelle authentique.

De plus, la discipline du folklore est des plus propres à corriger les abus d'une formation livresque et à développer l'esprit de recherche. La fréquentation du peuple traditionnel qu'exige cette discipline peut contribuer de façon très efficace à la formation du sens social de nos jeunes gens.

Nous ne saurions trop recommander les cours de folklore qui se donnent à la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université Laval.

- Nos bibliothèques de collèges devraient être mieux pourvues et dotées.
- Les Cercles de jeunes naturalistes, les Clubs 4-H, le scoutisme peuvent être d'excellentes initiatives qui développent l'esprit de recherche et d'observation.
- Les sports doivent être considérés non comme une fin en soi mais comme un moyen d'établir un parfait équilibre entre le développement du corps et celui de l'esprit.

Conclusions

Il est indéniable que nos collèges ont fait beaucoup pour l'éducation, et au prix des plus grands sacrifices. Pour mener à bonne fin, l'oeuvre qu'ils ont entreprise, ils ont besoin d'aide financière. Il faut donc les aider, tout en respectant la liberté de l'enseignement.

L'oeuvre primordiale, urgente à laquelle cette aide doit leur permettre de s'appliquer est la formation d'un corps magistral, stable et justement rémunéré.

Nous recommandons, en outre, la création d'un système de bourses, dès les dernières années, au moins, du cours secondaire. (Lire à ce sujet The Humanities in Canada, chapter XII).

A telles fins que le présent mémoire s'est proposées, nous insistons sur les rapports plus étroits et plus constants qui, pour la solution de tant de graves et délicats problèmes, devraient s'établir entre les universités et leurs collèges.

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Pauline Savard